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BIRTH CONTROL AND A NEW BIRTH
OF FREEDOM
HMZMT F. PiLPEL*
The author analyzes Griswold v. Connecticut and other recent
developments in the birth control movement and explains their
significance for constitutional theory. The Griswold case raised
the principle of voluntary family planning to the status of a consti-
tutional right. It also recognized the standing of those in the helping
professions to assert the rights of their patients and clients. The
Court's recognition of a right of privacy and restoration of meaning
to the ninth and tenth amendments may be a protection against
the increasing threat of a "big brother" society. Recent admini-
strative and judicial decisions emasculating the Comstock laws
demonstrate the importance of constitutional checks and balances.
The ultimate question posed by the Griswold case is whether it
will be recognized that the government has an affirmative obligation
to make the exercise of constitutional rights possible.
The year 1965 marked a turning point in the birth control move-
ment and in its wake some significant new aspects and implications in
the constitutional law of personal freedom. In June of that year the
United States Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law pro-
hibiting the use of contraceptives that had been on the statute books for
seventy-five years.' The decision culminated twenty-five years of
legal battling.2 In the same year and in the years directly preceding
and the year following the Supreme Court decision, many state and
federal government agencies and officials-from the President of the
United States on down-acknowledged not only the legality of birth
control but also the urgent need to make birth control available to
the underprivileged sectors of the population through public agencies.
By 1966, tax-supported birth control services were in existence, to a
greater or lesser extent in forty-two states and the District of Co-
lumbia.
Developments ranged from repeated encouragement of birth con-
* Member of the New York Bar and member of the national boards of directors
of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc.
I Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.2d
582 (1942), appeal dismissed, 318 US. 44 (1943); State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11
A.2d 856 (1940).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
trol activities by President Johnson to the repeal or the amendment of
many state laws which had stood in the way of publicly financed birth
control programs.4 In 1966 a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science
and Population was appointed by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to centralize and stress the Department's birth control
activities.5 Legislation was introduced into Congress by Senator Tyd-
ings and others calling for substantial and annually increasing federal
financial aid to state, local and private agencies in the birth control
field.
The Supreme Court decision and to a lesser extent the legislative,
administrative and policy changes which preceded and followed it
signal important developments, now only in their infancy, in our
basic concepts of government and constitutional law. I propose briefly
to discuss to some of these developments and some of their implications
for constitutional theory. They presage a necessary reevaluation of
old concepts, necessary, that is, if liberty is to remain a meaningful
concept in the daily lives of Americans, today and tomorrow.
8 In his Special Message to Congress on Health and Education, March 1, 1966,
112 Cong. Rec. 4239, President Johnson made the following statement:
We have a growing concern to foster the integrity of the family, and the
opportunity for each child. It is essential that all families have access to
information and services that will allow freedom to choose the number and
spacing of their children within the dictates of individual conscience.
In the fiscal 1967 budget, I have requested a sizeable increase in the funds
available for research, training, and services in this field. The National Institute
for Child Health and Human Development will expand its own research and
its grant program to study human reproduction. The Children's Bureau and
the Office of Economic Opportunity will support family planning in the
maternal and infant care programs in local communities when requested.
State agencies will be aided by Federal welfare funds to provide family
planning services to mothers.
Other statements made by President Johnson encouraging birth control are contained
in the following speeches: Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations at San Francisco,
June 25, 1966; Swearing in Ceremony of John W. Gardner as Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare, 1 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Documents 104 (1965); State of the
Union Address before Congress, 112 Cong. Rec. 129 (1966); Foreign Aid Program message
to Congress, 112 Cong. Rec. 1630 (1966); International Education and Health message,
112 Cong. Rec. 1652 (1966); War on Hunger message, 112 Cong. Rec. 2703 (1966).
4 The most recent states to repeal anti-birth control legislation or to enact laws
authorizing birth control activities included Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, and West Virginia. Planned Parenthood, Ending Comstockery in America I-V
(1965-66).
5 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1966, p. 22, col. 3, Late City Edition.
6 S. 2993, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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I. THE BIRTH CONTROL VICTORY: THE T1TJumPH OF VOLUNTARISm
In June of 1965 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional the Connecticut use statute, reversing the convictions as acces-
sories to the crime of use of Dr. C. Lee Buxton, the Medical Director
of the New Haven Planned Parenthood Center, and of Mrs. Estelle
Griswold, the Executive Director of the Center.7 Different Justices
took different paths to reach this result. The majority opinion written
by Justice Douglas held that the Connecticut law infringed "the zone of
privacy" created by the penumbra of various constitutional guarantees.'
It would seem, however, that in the specific context of birth control
the major significance of the seven to two decision is that it established
a principle of voluntarism. This principle recognizes and protects the
right of parents to "choose the number and spacing of their children
within the dictates of individual conscience."9 As Mr. Justice Goldberg
stated in his concurring opinion:
[T] otalitarian limitation of family size ... is at complete variance
with our constitutional concepts. . . . If, upon a showing of a
slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control
by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law
requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid.
In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably
intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally
protected.' 0
Mr. Justice Goldberg spoke not a moment too soon. To paraphrase
President Kennedy, this will be either the first generation to make pos-
sible the exercise of free choice in the birth control field or it will be
the last in which voluntary family planning is possible. The exigencies
of expanding populations are such that if the government does not make
possible voluntary birth control, compulsory birth control will be
increasingly advocated. Already in Mississippi and Georgia bills have
been introduced into the legislature which would have punished by
fine and/or imprisonment certain classes of persons, such as women
on welfare who already have one illegitimate child, who did not obtain
birth control advice and assistance." Already two different California
7 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 1.
8 Id. at 485.
9 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message on Health and Education, March
1, 1966, supra note 3.
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 1, at 497.
11 S.B. 1648, Regular Session of Miss. Legislature (1964).
Ironically, Mississippi also has a law which appears to make birth control illegal.
Mkiss. Code § 2289 (1942). But, so far as this writer knows, the law has never been
enforced.
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judges have given without statutory warrant a man and a woman de-
fendants the "choice" between jail and sterilization. 2 And there have
been premonitory rumblings elsewhere. Thus, the New York Times
for June 2, 1966 reported:
MOTHER AGREES TO BE STERILIZED
WOMAN WHO KILLED HER BABY ACCEPTS COURT
SUGGESTION
PHILADELPHIA, June 1-An unwed 24-year-old mother,
convicted of killing her four-day old son by dropping him into an
incinerator in the apartment building where she lived, has agreed
to submit to sterilization.
The woman, Francine Rutledge, took this step yesterday on
the strength of a promise by Judge Raymond Pace Alexander of a
reduced sentence for murder.
Voluntary sterilization is a method of birth control which should
be available to all, rich or poor, who wish no more children."3 But the
kind of coercion involved where people are made to choose between
sterilization and jail or a heavier jail sentence would seem to be
unconstitutional under the doctrine of voluntarism declared by the
Griswold case.
Also, the doctrine of that case throws into question the validity of
the compulsory sterilization statutes presently on the statute books of
about twenty-eight states. Just recently, Oregon passed a law providing
compulsory sterilization for those, among others, in state institutions
"who would probably become social menaces or wards of the State."' 4
Hitler demonstrated all too clearly what state authority over pro-
creation can and did mean. Totalitarian is too simple a word for it;
barbarian would do better. Therefore, if the Griswold decision had
done nothing more than establish a constitutional principle of volun-
tarism in reference to procreation, it would have been a major achieve-
ment. But, in fact, it established or foreshadowed the establishment of
a number of other constitutional realizations.
12 Hernandez v. State, Santa Barbara Munic. Ct. May 20, 1966, in Long Beach
California Independent, May 21, 1966, p. 1; Andrada v. State Pasadena Munic. Ct. Jan.,
1964, in N.Y. Post, Oct. 25, 1964, Magazine Sec., p. 6. col. 1. See also Graham, The Law:
'Sterilization or jail,' N.Y. Times, May 29, 1966, p. 8E, col. 1, Late City Edition.
13 H.B. 60, Georgia Legislature (1966), authorizes and provides a procedure for
voluntary surgical sterilization. See also Code of Va. ch. 32, §§ 423-427 (1964); N. Car.
Gen. Stat. §§ 190-271 (Supp. 1965).
14 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 436.050 (1965).
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II. THE RIGHT OF PHYsIcIs AND OTHERS IN THE HELPING
PROFESSIONS TO ASSERT THE RIGHTS OF THEIR PATIENTS
AND CLIENTS
One of the great obstacles to the obtaining of what Professor
Charles Reich of the Yale Law School has called "a bill of rights for
the disinherited" has been the procedural and technical rule that a
person may not challenge the constitutionality of government action
unless that action directly impinges on his own constitutional rights. 5
The United States Supreme Court has found this rule increasingly hard
to live with and has already departed from it in a number of cases.
For example, a white seller of real property was able successfully to
attack the validity of a restrictive covenant directed against Negroes. 6
In the Connecticut birth control case, Justice Douglas enunciated what
in effect was another departure from the rule: "We think that appel-
lants have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married
people with whom they had a professional relationship."' 7 While little
attention has been paid to this phase of the case, a substantial part of
the briefs and arguments in the Supreme Court was directed to it and
its importance cannot be overstated. For in today's world, the "dis-
inherited," the welfare recipients, and the poverty groups are usually
not able to assert their constitutional rights without further jeopardiz-
ing their extremely tenuous economic position. Therefore, it is likely
that only if physicians, public health workers, social welfare workers
and other helping professional personnel are legally able to assert the
rights of the underprivileged, will those rights be asserted at all. The
midnight raids on the homes of mothers receiving federal-aid-to-depen-
dent-children money in various states, including Illinois and California,
have aroused some protest on the part of those who know about them.'8
As a practical matter, however, judicial remedies have been sought, if
at all, by those who serve the poor and not by the poor themselves?
Fear of losing aid is a very effective deterrent to those who need that
aid to live.
IG Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,"
74 Yale L.J. 1245 (1965).
18 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
17 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 1 at 481.
18 Reich, "'Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act," 72 Yale L.J.
1347 (1963).
1o See Parrish v. Civil Service Commission of Alameda City, 35 U.S. Law Week
2021 (Calif. Ct. of App. 1966), holding that a social worker may be legally discharged
for refusing to participate in mass search for unauthorized males in homes of welfare
recipients.
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL "RIGHT OF PRIVACY"
Reference has already been made to the fact that the majority
decision of the Court in the Connecticut birth control case was premised
on there being a constitutionally protected zone of privacy which the
government may not enter. Here, too, the implications of the decision
obviously reach far beyond the area of birth control and procreation.
Justice Douglas found support for a constitutionally protected right
of privacy in some prior cases. These cases had established the right
to educate one's children as one chooses, 0 the right to study the German
language in a private school,21 the right to read,22 the freedom of the
entire university community,28 freedom to associate and privacy in
one's association2 4 The cases, said Justice Douglas, establishing rights
such as these "suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. . . . Various guarantees create zones
of privacy."25 He concluded that the "present case, then, concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several funda-
mental Constitutional guarantees . . . a right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights."26
At this time it is, of course, impossible to predict either the outer
or the inner limits of this "right of privacy." The new right should
not, in any event, be confused with what, until now, most lawyers
understood was meant by the phrase "right of privacy," namely, the
right of a private citizen to prevent his name and picture from being
used for advertising or commercial purposes, or in intimate, private,
or fictionalized contexts without his consent.2 7 This right is a right of
privacy only in the sense that it is a right against publicity and is no
part of the constitutional "right of privacy" declared in the Griswold
case. The Griswold decision indicates that the constitutional right of
privacy may have a far-reaching effect. Its adumbration and prolifera-
tion by the courts and perhaps by legislatures may prove to be a major
weapon in our ever-present struggle against a "big brother" society.
20 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
21 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
22 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
23 Baggett v. Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
24 N.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
25 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 1, at 484.
26 Id. at 485-6.
27 Prosser, Law of Torts, § 112 (3d ed. 1964). The recognition of this right of




Just as technological and scientific progress have made it possible for
us to destroy all life on this planet, so, too, technological and scientific
progress in such forms as electronic-snooping devices and mind-
influencing drugs have made it possible to destroy all privacy. The
emergence of a constitutional right of privacy, that right first given
utterance in the birth control case, may indeed save us from an
Orwellian 1984.
IV. THE REBIRTH OF THE NNTH AND TENTH AmENDMENTS
Justices Douglas and Goldberg, in particular, looked to the ninth
and tenth amendments for support of their theory that there is a hard
core area of individual liberty that is and should be secure from all
governmental intrusion.2" Prior to the Griswold decision, judges and
lawyers in general regarded these two amendments as being sub-
stantially meaningless. 2& 9
Some commentators have expressed the view that the reasoning
of Griswold was called into being by the "hard" case presented and
that "hard cases always make bad law." Others have opined that in
its declaration of a right of privacy and its reliance on the hitherto
overlooked ninth and tenth amendments, the Court has opened the
way to a new basis for protecting fundamental human rights. Only
time will tell which interpretation is correct. One thing, however, is
clear. By referring to the ninth and tenth amendments, the Court has
at least restored them to some significance in our constitutional scheme.
With totalitarian ideologies threatening to take over, and indeed taking
over, large parts of the world, there is something reassuring about
the declared concept that there are rights that are retained by the
people. Certain rights, of which a right of privacy is only one, have
been made necessary by twentieth century realities. These rights may
not fit into the precise wording of the Bill of Rights but they never-
theless belong there. Justices Black and Stewart dissented in Griswold
because the rights involved did not fit in any of the specific guarantees
of the first ten amendments. But the majority of the court by suggesting
a variety of different theories to expand the protection offered by the
Bill of Rights took a giant step in the direction of adapting these
guarantees of personal freedom to the world today.
28 Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 1, at 484, 87.
29 Justice Goldberg found support for his interpretation in Redlich, "Are There
'Certain Rights Retained by the People'?" 37 N.Y.UL,. Rev. 787 (1962); Patterson,
"The Forgotten Ninth Amendment" (1965); Kelsey, "The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution," 11 Ind. LJ. 309 (1936).
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V. CHEcKs AND BALANCES: A NEw MEANING FOR THE OLD
CONCEPT
Although the Connecticut birth control case has been the only
decision on the merits rendered in the birth control field by the
United States Supreme Court, other courts have for decades been
struggling with other repressive birth control laws which, like the
Connecticut law but not so extreme, emanated from the original federal
ban enacted by Congress at the instigation of Anthony Comstock.
Until the early 1960's, virtually every effort to change the state
and federal anti-birth control laws on the books had failed. Federal
and state legislatures alike had refused to repeal or change the laws,
most of which dated back to 1873 or thereabouts. Indeed, the
original federal Comstock laws remain on the federal statute books
today, in substantially the same terms as when they were passed.'
However, beginning in 1930, federal courts found it untenable to
construe these laws literally, for so construed they were absurd,
unreasonable and perhaps unconstitutional. For example, in 1930,
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated with
reference to the federal laws:
Taken literally, this language would seem to forbid the transpor-
tation by mail or common carriage of anything "adapted" in the
sense of being suitable or fitted, for preventing conception or for
any indecent or immoral purpose, even though the article might also
be capable of legitimate uses and the sender in good faith supposed
that it would be used only legitimately . ..it would seem reason-
able to give the word "adapted" a more limited meaning than that
above suggested and to construe the whole phrase "designed,
adapted or intended" as requiring an intent on the part of the
sender that the article mailed or shipped by common carrier be used
for illegal contraception or abortion or for indecent or immoral
purposes. 32
This interpretation was reiterated and strengthened when the
same court in 1936 said, with reference to the entire pattern of federal
law in this area:
Its design, in our opinion, was not to prevent the importation,
sale or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be
employed by conscientious and competent physicians for the purpose
of saving life or promoting the well-being of their patients. The word
"unlawful" would make this clear as to articles for producing
30 The original Comstock Act, Act of March 3, 1873 ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
31 18 U.S.C. §§ 552, 1461, 1462, 1463 (1952); 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1952).
32 Youngs Rubber Co. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1930).
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abortion, and the courts have read an exemption into the act
covering such articles even where the word "unlawful" is not used.
The same exception should apply to articles for preventing con-
ception.33
Finally, the same court put the matter succinctly when it said in
1938: "We have twice decided that contraceptive articles may have
lawful uses and that statutes prohibiting them should be read as
forbidding them only when unlawfully employed." 4
Since the 1930's and especially within the last few years, many
federal governmental agencies have been increasingly active in sup-
porting the distribution of contraceptives and contraceptive informa-
tion. Among them are various agencies of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, the Department of Interior, the Agency for
International Development, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. 5
Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have characterized popu-
lation control as a matter of prime national and international im-
portance, and in 1966 former Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight
Eisenhower became co-chairmen of the fund raising campaign of the
Planned Parenthood Federation.
The present limited range of the Comstock laws became dramati-
cally clear in 1963 when the St. Louis Post Office sought to prevent
the mailing of samples of a contraceptive which were being mailed in
response to coupons contained in ads appearing in nineteen national
magazines with a lay readership of about thirty-one million people.
The coupons called for the person filling them out to state if she was
married and, if so, when she was married. After many discussions and
memoranda, both the Post Office Department and the Justice Depart-
ment agreed that the samples could, notwithstanding the Comstock
laws, be lawfully mailed in the absence of any affirmative showing by
the government that they were to be used for an unlawful purpose30
The Customs Department shortly followed suit with a similar ruling.
Since it is unlikely that anyone mailing, shipping or importing a
contraceptive will indicate that it is to be used for an unlawful purpose,
the federal laws on the subject have been "checked and balanced" to
the point where, except for the uncertainties they create, they have
little, if any, effect on federal birth control programs or the transmission
83 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1936).
34 United States v. Nicholas, 97 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1938).
35 Hearings on S. 1676 Before the Sub-Committee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2-A, at 740
(1965).
30 N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1963, p. 30, col. 2, Late City Edition.
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of birth control supplies or information through the mails or in inter-
state or foreign commerce.
Only about half of the states had anti-birth control laws at any
time and most of these, with the exception of Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts, were more or less regulatory rather than prohibitive. When
these statutes came before state courts, which they rarely did, they
also were generally interpreted not to interfere with such legitimate
birth control activities as prescriptions by physicians. By 1966,
however, after almost a century of legislative inaction, many of these
states, culminating with Massachusetts, 7 had either repealed the
"little Comstock Acts" or had amended them to permit the develop-
ment and expansion of birth control programs. 8
The history of anti-birth control legislation in this country is a
unique example of the Constitution's built-in system of checks and
balances. The courts and executive and administrative officials, faced
with the necessity of applying and construing obsolete laws which
the legislatures were unable or unwilling to change, managed, except in
Connecticut and Massachusetts, to adapt these nineteenth century
morality statutes to twentieth century population and birth control
realities. Hopefully, a similar development must and will follow in
the field of abortion. To such pioneers as Margaret Sanger, Drs.
Hannah and Abraham Stone, Morris L. Ernst, and the many others
who forged the first legal victories in the birth control field, particular
credit is due for this reassuring story of democracy in action.
VI. DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION
TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE EXERCISE OF BIRTH CONTROL?
As pointed out above, Griswold established the right of voluntarism
in family planning. 9 The establishment of this right was a significant
achievement, but what does the right mean to those who have no
access to the information or supplies which make birth control
possible? Unless the government recognizes an obligation to provide
birth control information and supplies where needed, the right of
voluntarism will be meaningless to many citizens.
It may be that the Supreme Court will go beyond a laissez faire
approach and recognize that a right without the wherewithal to exercise
that right is no right at all. Indeed, in some areas, the Court has
37 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §§ 21, 21A (1966).
88 The most recent states include California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, and Ohio. Planned
Parenthood, Ending Comstockery in America I-V (1956-66).
89 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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already held that the government has an obligation to make constitu-
tional rights meaningful to the economically deprived.40 For example,
Gideon v. Wainwright held that the government must furnish legal
representation to persons accused of crime who cannot afford it.'
These decisions appear to recognize that in many situations government
inaction is identical with government action and therefore subject to the
same constitutional guarantees. Arguably, the same reasoning is
applicable whenever government inaction prevents citizens from
exercising fundamental constitutional rights, including the right of
family planning.
The question of government inaction being equivalent to govern-
ment action is of special significance for those whom Professor Reich
calls the "disinherited." In a growing number of contexts, constitutional
rights simply do not exist for these people unless the government
makes their exercise possible. Perhaps the public's gradual recognition
of this fact explains why our ever increasing welfare state is accepting
the responsibility of feeding, clothing, and jobbing those among us
who would otherwise be starving, naked, and unemployed. The impor-
tant constitutional question raised by this development, however, is
whether the government's assistance to the poor is based on grace or
right.
Arguably, fundamental notions of human decency require that the
relationship between the government and the poor be based on what
Professor Reich has termed "entitlement."43 When the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights were adopted, the danger to liberty was thought to
be, and probably was, repressive action by the government. Hence, the
Constitution is full of "thou shalt nots" directed against affirmative
governmental interference with the basic human rights enumerated
in the Constitution. Today, government inaction poses a greater threat
to the liberty of many persons than government action. While in the
40 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (duty to furnish legal counsel);
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (duty to pay or waive filing fee); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1955) (duty to furnish or waive transcript).
41 Ibid.
42 The possibility of government action and inaction producing identical effects was
recognized by Justice Stone many years ago in an entirely different context. In the case
of Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), government inaction would result in the
destruction of apple trees by a cedar blight. Government action to protect the apple
trees, however, would result in the destruction of the cedar trees. Professor Robert
L. Hale of Columbia Law School pointed out the significance of this case more than
thirty years ago in "Force and the State: A Comparison of Political and Economic
Compulsion," 35 Colum. L. Rev. 149 (1935).
43 Reich, "Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues," 74
Yale L.J. 1245 (1965).
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1780's and 90's the government accepted little, if any, responsibility
for the welfare of its citizens, today the government has undertaken
formerly undreamed of welfare responsibilities. Government action has
been a response to political expediency not constitutional guarantees.
Nevertheless, it may become apparent that the government's assump-
tion of greater responsibilities has created new expectations and rights.
It is too early to predict what will be the long range impact of
the Griswold case on United States constitutional theory. Hopefully,
it will serve as an important stepping stone in the development of our
constitutional scheme. Our Declaration of Independence speaks of it
being self-evident that "all men are created equal," that they are
"endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" and that
"among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Today it
is self-evident that some men are "more equal" than others and that
there are many who without government intervention would not be able
to live, to be free, or even to pursue-no less achieve-happiness. It
may therefore be a necessary next step to acknowledge that the govern-
ment, by the mandates of a Constitution that has shown a remarkable
ability to grow with the times, has an affirmative obligation to create
at least minimal conditions of freedom and that among these conditions
is the freedom to decide when and whether to bring new life into the
world. We all recognize that the government may not take life except
by due process of law. Should not the government also have an equal
duty not to deny the right to create life, on the one hand, nor to force
the creation of life on the other by failing to make available information
and supplies to those who without government assistance have no free-
dom of choice?
Whatever the answer to this question, and whether or not it
stems from the Connecticut birth control case, that case and the
history of birth control in this country clearly open up lines of inquiry,
the developments and responses to which will have much to do, not
only with the birth of humans, but also with the continuing process of
the rebirth of freedom.
